A STRUCTURATION ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PRIVATISED GAS INDUSTRY
A
STRUCTURATION ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PRIVATISED
GAS INDUSTRY
by
Lynne Conrad
CCR Working Paper CCR 01-3
Abstract
This study investigates the consequences of
regulation for management control and organisational change in privatised
industries by means of a case study of the gas industry. It particularly focuses on the implications
of regulation for accounting systems and systems of accountability, as
important management control systems.
Giddens’ (1979, 1984) structuration theory is adopted as an analytical
framework for the study, due to its demonstrated capacity to take into account
the interaction of agency and social structures in the production, reproduction
and regulation of social order, together with its potential for an analysis of
organisational change. A case study
research method is identified as valuable for its potential to reveal a rich
and detailed understanding of the functioning of management control and the
factors influencing change in organisations.
A framework is developed which demonstrates the suitability of
structuration theory for a cultural analysis of management control and
organisational change, and identifies the existence of three distinct cultures
in relation to the gas industry over the ten year period following
privatisation. These cultures, of public
service, commercial business and competition, provide the foundation for the
empirical analysis which identifies the distinctive features of each culture,
highlights control problems and conflicts, and provides an analysis of the key
factors leading to the emergence of each new culture. This study contributes to the body of
knowledge on the impact of regulation on privatised industries by providing a
contextual analysis of management control and organisational change in the gas
industry, and also by providing a critique of the change which has taken place.
Keywords:
organisational change; accounting
and accountability systems; structuration theory; regulation of privatised
industries.
FIRST DRAFT: NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT
AUTHOR’S PERMISSION
Contact details:
Dr. Lynne Conrad, School of Management,
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ Email: l.conrad@uea.ac.uk
ISSN
1473-8473
This paper reports and analyses the findings of a case
study of accounting systems and systems of accountability, important management
control systems, in the British gas industry during the period 1986 to
1998. These developments arose in the
context of broader organisational changes resulting from the transformation of
the nationalised British Gas Corporation into the privatised and regulated
utility, British Gas. Giddens’ (1979, 1984) structuration theory is identified
as valuable for this study, given its rejection of the subjectivist-objectivist
dualism which characterises the methodological debate, and its emphasis on
‘…both the meaningful actions of individual agents and the structural features
of social contexts’ (Held and Thompson, 1989, p.3) in understanding the
production, reproduction and regulation of social order. It is also demonstrated to have the potential
for an analysis of organisational change, as it emphasises the importance of
conflict, contradiction and unintended consequences in effecting change. The
paper continues with a discussion of the way in which accounting and
accountability systems can be understood in terms of the interaction of
structures of signification, legitimation and domination. A case study research
method is identified as compatible with a structuration analysis, given the aim
of case study research of ‘…developing a rich theoretical framework which is
capable of explaining the holistic quality of observed social systems and the
practices of human actors’ (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1993, p.118). Two case studies which use structuration
theory in an analysis of organisational and accounting change and resistance to
such change are reviewed. Before
proceeding to the empirical analysis, the paper continues with the development
of an analytical framework which demonstrates the suitability of structuration
theory for a cultural analysis of management control and organisational change,
and the identification of three distinct cultures in relation to the gas
industry over the ten year period following privatisation. These three cultures, of public service, commercial
business and competition provide the framework for the empirical analysis, and
explication of the main structures of signification, legitimation and
domination underlying each culture forms the next part of the paper. Evidence from a case study of the gas
industry is presented, providing evidence of the existence of the three
cultures, their implications for management control and an examination of the
processes of change which led to the emergence of each new culture, with
particular reference to the role of conflict and crisis in effecting
change. The first empirical section
examines the key features of the public service culture which characterised the
nationalised gas industry and considers the control problems which led to
radical change in the form of privatisation, particularly highlighting the
serious accountability problems which led to a questioning of both the
organisation’s and government’s legitimacy.
The second empirical section discusses the emergence of the commercial
business culture, with its new focus on profitability and shareholder
value. Continuing accountability
problems are highlighted and the lack of adequate accountability mechanisms to
ensure public accountability of the regulator is discussed. The final empirical section shows how
conflict and crisis eventually led to radical organisational change, as the
regulator became more powerful, and the impact of competition and falling gas
prices eventually led to the demerger of British Gas into two organisations.
This study contributes to the literature on management
control and organisational change by providing a contextual analysis of these
processes in the gas industry during a period of turbulent change. It also adds to the literature on contextual
studies of accounting, in particular in relation to the ‘transformative
capacities’ (Ogden, 1995) of ‘new accountings’ (Morgan and Willmott, 1993;
Broadbent and Guthrie, 1993) in public sector organisations. In terms of methodology it demonstrates the
suitability of Giddens' (1979, 1984) structuration theory as a basis for a
contextual study of management control and organisational change. The results
of this research have potential policy implications for the future economic and
political regulation of privatised industries, including the structure of
regulatory bodies as multiple service provision by individual utilities is
extended in the future.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Structuration theory is concerned with the relationship
between agents' actions and social structures in the production, reproduction
and regulation of social order. Social
systems comprise the situated activities of human agents, reproduced across
time and space. These systems have
structures, conceptualised as rules and resources, which are the abstract codes
or templates which guide actors' behaviour in social settings. Structures are seen to be both enabling and
constraining of human action. Agency,
the other main attribute of a social system, is defined as the intentional
actions of self-conscious individuals as they interact with others in social
situations.
A crucial theme of the theory is that the rules and
resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at
the same time the means of system reproduction.
Actors in social settings produce (or reproduce) structures, but at the
same time are guided by them.
This aspect of the theory is termed 'duality of structure'
by Giddens.
The concept of structuration, which gives the theory its name, reflects the
idea that structure and agency exist in a recursive relationship. It is important to realise that while
structuration denotes the process whereby social systems usually function to
almost automatically reproduce the status quo, at other times they may undergo
radical change. Agents take part in
social interactions in a way that presents them with the possibility of acting
positively in such a manner that social codes are sometimes modified and at
other times altered drastically.
According to Macintosh (1994), this is an important attribute of
structuration theory:
'Instead of limiting the analysis to a
snapshot, as in many other frameworks, structuration analysis brings the dynamics
of history and change onto the scene.’ (p.171)
Important to an analysis of change are the concepts of
conflict (at the action level) and contradiction (at the structure level). Additionally, Giddens emphasises the notion
of the 'dialectic of control', whereby all agents are deemed to have some
power, except in a few very unusual situations where complete powerlessness
means that they can no longer be classed as agents. A final concept relevant to the analysis of
change is that of unintended consequences of action, whereby intentional
actions may result in unintended consequences, which subsequently feed forward
to be the unacknowledged conditions of further actions.
The mutual dependency of agency and structure, and their
link via modalities is portrayed in the following diagram (Giddens, 1984,
p.29), discussed in detail below:
Structure Signification ⇔ Domination ⇔ Legitimation
(modality) interpretive scheme facility
Interaction Communication ⇔ Power ⇔ Sanction
Structures as rules include codes of signification or the
constitution of meaning (signification structures), and normative elements or
the sanctioning of modes of social conduct (legitimation structures). Structures as resources are the bases of
power (domination structures). The
modalities of structuration are the procedures which mediate between the
(virtual) structure and the (situated) interaction.
In terms of the diagram above, referring firstly to
signification, interpretive schemes are the cognitive means by which each actor
makes sense of what others say and do.
They are the 'frames of reference' and 'stocks of knowledge' used by
actors in the production of interaction. Within the context of this study the
shared rules, concepts and theories of free-market economics comprise a
signification structure drawn upon by regulator and regulated to make sense of
organisational activities. The
regulatory price formula may be seen as an interpretive scheme which represents
the signification structure and enables interaction between regulator and
regulated in the form of communication about organisational activities.
In terms of legitimation, the structural property of
morality in the form of evaluative rules connects sanction at the level of
interaction with legitimation at the level of structure (Giddens, 1979, p.97).
Legitimation structures consist of the normative rules and moral obligations of
a social system. They constitute the shared set of values and ideals about what
is important and should happen in social settings (Macintosh, 1994).
Thus in this case the legitimation structure may be seen to
include the values and ideals communicated by the regulatory regime as
appropriate for privatised industries, such as limited price increases,
adequate standards of service, etc..
Again the price formula can be seen to embody the norms of
organisational behaviour by quantifying appropriate standards and enabling the
regulator to hold the regulated accountable, and to implement sanctions and
rewards as required.
Looking now at domination, at the level of interaction agents' ability to exercise influence and
draw on facilities or resources of power is related to domination at the level
of structure. Giddens (1979, 1984) identifies two types of resources of
power; command over allocative resources
(objects, goods and other material phenomena) is a feature of economic institutions,
while command over authoritative resources (the capability to organise and
coordinate the activities of social actors) is a feature of political
institutions. He also emphasises two
types of power. He refers firstly to the
'transformative capacity of human action', which one may view as a positive
outcome, and secondly to 'relational power' or domination, involving reproduced
relations of autonomy and dependence in social interaction, which may have a
more negative connotation. As Macintosh
(1994) says, power in its broad sense is the ability to get things done, while
power in its narrow sense is simply domination.
Giddens (1979, 1984) says that all social relations involve power in
both senses, but the exercise of power is not a uni-directional process. Here he emphasises the 'dialectic of
control', that all social relations involve both autonomy and dependence. Macintosh (1994) emphasises that normally
power flows smoothly and its far-reaching effects go almost unnoticed in the
process of social reproduction. But
sometimes its effects are clearly visible and understood, e.g. in times of
war. While power works to constrain
individuals, and gain their co-operation, it is also a medium for emancipatory
effort.
In the context of this study, we can see domination
structures in the exercise of power by the regulator in order to enforce the
introduction of competition into the gas industry, drawing on the authoritative
and allocative resources of OFGAS. The
extent to which such power is transformative or coercive will be examined.
Structuration theory affords a way of making sense of the
social processes which have helped shape regulatory control. It can contribute to an analysis of the
changes which have taken place at an organisational level and at a wider
societal level, which have led to the emergence of new social systems. As a sensitising device, it alerts us to the
relevant dimensions of social structure, particularly the way in which
structures of signification are inextricably linked to structures of
legitimation and domination. It
emphasises the crucial role of agency in the reproduction or change of existing
structures. In addition, it highlights
the importance of conflict and crisis in effecting change, which is a central feature of this
study.
Having demonstrated how structuration theory can enable
organisational change to be understood in terms of the dimensions of social
structure, namely structures of signification, domination and legitimation, it
is important to consider how change actually comes about. Structuration theory
also offers several useful concepts to enable such an analysis of the dynamics
of change, including 'duality of structure', 'dialectic of control',
'conflict', 'crisis' and 'unintended consequences of action'.
The pace of change in the gas industry was relatively slow
in the initial period after privatisation, but subsequently accelerated
rapidly. Giddens (1979, 1984) emphasises
the importance of 'duality of structure', the interaction of agency and structure
in the production and reproduction of social practices. His stratification model of the agent draws
attention to three levels of consciousness and suggests that while a great deal
of action takes place routinely at a practical level of consciousness, possibly
rationalised at a discursive level of consciousness, nevertheless unconscious
motivations also play a part in human behaviour, and that a need for
ontological security, lodged in the unconscious, may sometimes explain why agents
routinely reproduce systems they recognise as coercive.
Other concepts at the action level include the role of
'unintended consequences', which can subsequently become the unacknowledged
conditions of future action. One example
in this study which it is interesting to consider from this perspective is how
management eventually chose to demerge the organisation even though this was
not a regulatory requirement, and even though they had fought for years to
retain an integrated organisation.
The notion of the 'dialectic of
control' may also provide insights here, in regard to senior management's
conflicts with the regulatory bodies,
since as Giddens (1979, 1984) says, every actor has some resources under
his control, otherwise he ceases to be an agent. In demerging the organisation, management may
have felt that they were exercising what power remained with them. It is also a useful concept in analysing how
senior management pushed through change in the face of possible opposition at
lower levels in the organisation.
The final concepts to discuss are those of 'conflict' and
'crisis'. As Giddens says (1979, 1984),
in critical or crisis situations conventions and social codes may be abandoned
in favour of new ones, with agency taking overt control to reshape prevailing
social structures. This study will
reveal many instances of conflict between regulator and regulated, as a battle
for control was fought over several years, and the eventual crisis faced by
British Gas management as encroaching competition eroded their market and put
the survival of the organisation at risk.
The next section will demonstrate the suitability of a
structuration analysis for an understanding of accounting and accountability
systems, by explaining how their functioning can be understood in terms of the
interaction of agency and structures of signification, legitimation and
domination.
STRUCTURATION THEORY,
ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
Structuration theory is useful for a study of
accountability and accounting systems, as has been demonstrated in a number of
previous studies, including those by Roberts and Scapens (1985), Capps et al
(1989) and Macintosh and Scapens (1990).
Roberts and Scapens (1985), drawing on structuration
theory, outline a framework for understanding how systems of accountability
work in organisations. They say that the operation of systems of accountability
in specific contexts of interaction can be analysed in terms of individuals
drawing upon and reproducing structures of signification, domination and
legitimation. The language of the
particular system of accountability provides a structure of meanings for
interaction, the signification structure.
In terms of a system of financial accountability this would include
'costs', 'profit', etc. whereas in a
more production-oriented organisation, such as Capps et al (1989) discuss in
their study of the coal industry, the language may centre around 'tonnage',
'manhours', etc.. Systems of
accountability also embody a moral order, the legitimation structure, since they
define rights and obligations, including the rights of some to hold others to
account. Finally, the two aspects of
power defined by Giddens (1979, 1984) as constituting domination structures are
also evident in systems of accountability.
Power in the sense of 'transformative capacity' relates to a view of
systems of accountability as a resource for organisation, enabling diverse
practices to be integrated and coordinated.
Power in the sense of coercion is evident in the tendency for systems of
accountability to operate in one direction only, from subordinate to superior.
However, stressing the dialectic of control Roberts and Scapens (1985)
emphasise, reiterating Giddens (1979, 1984), that no-one is entirely without
resources and those who are held accountable frequently have means at their disposal
to influence the operation of systems of accountability to their own advantage.
The foregoing discussion provides a number of valuable insights into how
structuration theory can provide a framework for the analysis of accountability
relationships in this study. To
reiterate Day and Klein (1987):
'Accountability is the construction of an
agreed language or currency of discourse about conduct and performance, and the
criteria that should be used in assessing them.
It is a social and political process.
It is about perceptions and power.' (p.2) Since the giving of a
financial account is often a very important basis of accountability, it is
worthwhile considering how accounting systems fit into systems of
accountability, and how they can both reflect and reproduce such systems. Accounting information is an important
mechanism of control in the regulatory process, with some of the most important
changes in privatised industries relating to a new emphasis on financial
controls, and as such it is given considerable attention in this study. As Macintosh and Scapens (1990) say, in terms
of structuration theory accounting systems can be viewed as interpretive
schemes within the signification structure, enabling communication between
regulator and regulated, and being informed by shared rules and concepts of
accounting practice. In terms of the
domination structure, accounting information enables the exercise of power by
those who have the information, and who hold others accountable on the basis of
it. The notion of dialectic of control
is relevant here since, although the industry is required to provide the
regulator with certain information, management clearly has some discretion over
accounting policy choices, bases of cost allocations, etc., and can thus
influence regulatory decision-making in this way. It also plays a key role in
regard to the legitimation structure.
The way in which regulation has evolved in the years since privatisation
suggests there may be many instances where uncertainty provided opportunities
for management and regulator to manipulate accounting information to legitimate
their own actions.
The next section will discuss the reasons for adopting a
case study research method, and will demonstrate the compatibility of such a
method with a methodology based on structuration theory.
RESEARCH METHODS
A case study method was adopted for this research for its
holistic approach to understanding organisational and accounting change, given
that it enables researchers to:
‘…develop a rich theoretical framework which
is capable of explaining the holistic quality of observed social systems and
the practices of human actors. (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1992, p.118)
Scapens and Roberts (1993) provide an example of an
explanatory case study (Yin, 1989), in which they investigate why resistance to change took place in
one organisation:
‘…the objectives of the study are to explore
the complex web of social processes which comprise accounting change, to
illustrate their historical and contingent character, and to illustrate how the
process of change can inadvertently create the conditions which defeat the
content of change.’ (p.1)
The authors emphasise that their objective is not to derive
universal truths or generalisable theories, but rather to explain the social
processes at work, and thus illuminate the reasons for the failure of a project
to introduce a new accounting system into an organisation, when on the face of
it the organisational actors involved, both unit and divisional managers,
recognised the need for improved information systems. They use Giddens’ (1979, 1984) structuration
theory as a ‘sensitising device’ (p.3) to help them interpret their research
findings, but again state that the role of theory in this methodology is not to
generalise but to explain, with explanations coming from the case, not from an
imposition of a theory on the case. Structuration theory enabled the authors to
explain the failure of the project in terms of resistance to the imposition of
a new interpretive scheme, in the form of superseding the language of
production with the language of accounting, as well as to reveal the complexity
of the domination structures in the organisation and their role in the failure
of the project.
Another study which uses a structuration theory approach in
conjunction with a case study research method is that of Capps et al
(1989). Their discussion of the mining
culture in an Area of the National Coal Board, and the resistance to attempts
to introduce private sector financial models reveals how colliery life was
understood in terms of the signification structures of a production
perspective, rather than those of a financial perspective. They explain how this persisted in terms of
the domination of engineers at management level and the legitimation of their
position due to the overwhelming concern for underground safety and the
preservation and security of the local community whose livelihoods depended on
coal.
These studies provide support for the suitability of the
case study method for research into organisational change, as well as for
developing an understanding of resistance to change in public sector
organisations. Hence, a case study
method was adopted for an analysis of change in organisational control in the
privatised gas industry. The case study
consisted of semi-structured interviews with staff in the industry and relevant
regulatory bodies, and other interested parties. To enhance the reliability of the findings
and the validity of the analysis the well-established technique of
‘triangulation’ (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1992) was employed, where multiple
data sources are used in an effort to obtain corroboration of evidence. Thus, interviews were conducted with
individuals in different parts of British Gas and outside who might be expected
to give different perspectives, and the interview results were complemented by
observation of practices and review of documentary sources, such as company
documents and media reports.
Twenty eight tape-recorded interviews were carried out over
a six month period, including eighteen with senior management of British Gas in the fields of
Finance, Regulatory Affairs and Personnel.[1] It is important to note that interviewees
were selected based on advice from personal contacts[2]
as to who were the most knowledgeable and relevant people to speak to, rather
than as a result of being directed towards only those who would provide the
‘party line’, as might have occurred had it been necessary to seek permission
from e.g. a Managing Director in order to conduct interviews. Discussions with such a broad range of senior
management, targeted at individuals who had been with the company since
pre-privatisation days, provided a rich source of valuable information to
address the research questions of this study.
Additionally, interviews were held with 2 individuals from
the Office of Gas Supply
(OFGAS), 2 from the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), 3 new
competitors in the industry, 1 consultant (former City analyst in Oil and Gas)
and 2 academics with a particular interest in regulation of privatised
industries. Interview material was supplemented with desk research, including
review of regulatory reports, financial statements, company documents and media
coverage, as well as a review of the academic literature relating to
privatisation and regulation. The broad
spectrum of interviewees, including some individuals ‘on the other side of the
fence’ from BG management, such as competitors and staff from the
office of the regulator, coupled with a wide range of documentary sources,
lends weight to the validity of the findings.
The key features of each of the three cultural structures
which characterised British Gas during the period of the study will now be
discussed, prior to examining the operation of accountability and accounting
systems in each culture, and how change occurred.
THREE CULTURAL STRUCTURES
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the rationale
for viewing the three elements of public service, commercial business and
competition as three cultural structures, as a framework for an analysis of
regulatory control and organisational change in a privatised organisation. The
key aspects of each cultural structure will be identified, highlighting within
the context of each structure the main aspects of signification, legitimation
and domination. It is important to note
that while the three cultures are analytically separable, and provide a
valuable basis for discussing and understanding change, they are not in
practice clearly distinguishable as there are in fact many commonalities across
the three cultures, and indeed this is an important reason for many of the
conflicts experienced as individuals involved in the regulatory process
endeavoured to cope with some of the contradictions inherent in providing a
public service in an increasingly commercial and competitive environment.
Smircich (1983), in discussing concepts of culture for organisational analysis,
argues that it is possible to view culture either as a variable or as a root
metaphor. Culture as a variable can be:
‘…considered to be a background factor, an
explanatory variable or a broadframework influencing the development and
reinforcement of beliefs…it is imported into the organisation through the
membership. Its presence is believed to
be revealed in the patterns of attitudes and actions of individual organisation
members.’ (p.343)
Some authors consider this an impoverished view of culture,
and are critical of the belief in culture as something which can be imposed or
encouraged by managers. Alternatively,
it is possible to view the organisation as a socio-cultural system. Under this approach culture becomes a root
metaphor for the organisation. Culture
is portrayed in terms of systems of cognition and beliefs, patterns of symbolic
discourse or manifestations of unconscious processes:
‘…that yield and shape meanings and are
fundamental to the very existence of organisation.’ (Smircich, 1983, p.353)
Smircich (1983) thus suggests that the emergence of social
organisation depends on the emergence of shared interpretive schemes, and Capps
et al (1989) suggest that an important part of research into culture is to
elicit shared realities among groups of people.
However, the latter also suggest that it is important to explain the
mechanisms of the emergence and reproduction of cultures over time, and they
suggest that the role of power in the transformation and continuation of
culture is often understated. Since
structuration theory emphasises the interaction of agency and structure in the
production and reproduction of social systems, and since power as an impetus for change is an
important part of the theory, Capps et al (1989) found it to be valuable for
their analysis of:
‘..continuity and discontinuities in an
empirical situation with a distinctive culture and tradition, which appeared to
be under threat.’ (p.217)
This study was undertaken at a time when the gas industry
had undergone several profound changes which took place over a period of ten
years as the result of much conflict and a number of crises. Resistance to change was evident as
management battled the industry regulator and several MMC inquiries took
place. This study examines and analyses
the conflicts and the changes, and provides empirical evidence of the developments
over the ten years following privatisation.
Three distinct phases in relation to organisational change were
discovered, and it is believed that the linking of structuration theory and
concepts of culture offers the opportunity to develop a useful analytical
framework to explain regulatory control and organisational change over the
period of the study. A similar approach
was used by Chan (1990) to analyse accounting regulation in Hong Kong.
The framework is portrayed below:
Cultures Public Commercial
Service Business
|
Competition
|
Related Public Commercial
|
Free Market
|
Signification
Service Principles Structures Principles
|
Principles
|
Related Citizen rights; Business
|
Competitive
|
Domination Ministerial Dynamics;
|
Market;
|
Structures authority Regulation
|
Regulation
|
Related Social obligations Pursuit of financial
|
Market forces
|
Legitimation are
accepted success is
|
are preferred
|
Structures encouraged
The public service culture embodied the signification
structures of the welfare state, with nationalised industries existing to
ensure full and fair access to essential services for all at a fair price and
to contribute towards providing full employment. The signification structures were reflected
in related structures of domination and legitimation, with nationalised
industries being accountable for provision of a universal service, recognising
the rights of citizens, and being formally accountable to the public via the
relevant minister, and through him to Parliament. The commercial business culture emerged in
the early years following privatisation, and paralleled efforts to introduce
managerialism (Hopwood, 1984, 1990; Guthrie, 1991; Pollitt, 1986, 1990) into
the public sector more generally. Based
on a belief that management of public sector organisations was complacent and
inefficient due to a lack of market pressures to improve performance, efforts
were made by government to introduce more financial accountability into these
organisations. Power and Laughlin (1992,
p.133) coined the term ‘accountingisation’ to encompass measures introduced in
various areas of the public sector, including education, health and local
government. Nationalised industries were
privatised in an effort to introduce more financial discipline, with new
domination structures as accountability to shareholders replaced ministerial
accountability. Thus new signification
structures based primarily on financial measures emerged, with related
legitimation structures as management found themselves encouraged to pursue
financial success, albeit tempered by a new domination structure in the form of
the industry regulator, given that the new organisational forms were in fact
privatised monopolies. Eventually, and
after much conflict, the competition culture emerged based on structures of
signification, domination and legitimation which were underpinned by
free-market economics, and the superiority of market forces in the allocation of
resources. The regulator remained as a
formal structure of domination, as transition to the new culture took place,
taking steps to positively promote competition and help new entrants become
established in the market. The next
section will discuss in more detail the signification, domination and
legitimation aspects of the three cultures apparent in the gas industry pre-
and post- privatisation.
PUBLIC SERVICE, COMMERCIAL BUSINESS AND COMPETITION
CULTURES
Signification structures
This section will illustrate with examples the key features
of each of the three cultural structures. Stewart and Ranson's (1988)
comparison of public sector and private sector models offers a useful basis for
understanding the signification structures drawn upon by actors in interaction
in the public service and competition cultures respectively, and the relevant
aspects will be reviewed in the appropriate sections. However, as this study reveals, change in the
gas industry did not simply involve a move from one ideal-type to another. An interim stage is revealed in this study,
termed here the commercial business culture, so the relevant section will
attempt to provide some comparatives for the various aspects of Stewart and
Ranson's two organisational types for that phase of organisational change.
TABLE 1.
Summary of the Three Cultures
Public
Service Culture
|
Commercial
Business Culture
|
Competition
Culture
|
Collective choice in the
polity
|
Shareholder ownership
|
Individual choice in the
market
|
Need for resources
|
Cost effectiveness
|
Demand and price
|
Openness for public action
|
Managerialism
|
Closure for private action
|
The equity of need
|
The equity of financial
measures
|
The equity of the market
|
The search for justice
|
The search for enhanced financial
returns
|
The search for market
satisfaction
|
Citizenship
|
Consumerism
|
Customer sovereignty
|
Collective action as the
instrument of the polity
|
Profitability as the instrument
of the business environment
|
Competition as the instrument of
the market
|
Voice as the condition
|
Consumer rights
|
Exit as the stimulus
|
The public service culture can be seen to be based on a
belief in the rights of all citizens to receive essential services, leading to
an organisational mission in this case to provide a safe, secure gas supply to
all who required it. Some of the
cultural structures, reflecting the beliefs, norms and values of organisational
members, drawn upon by actors in reproducing such a culture can be seen in
Stewart and Ranson's model for the public sector ideal-type.
The model emphasises that in the public domain scarce
resources have to be used to satisfy unmet needs. Collective choice is involved in defining the
needs and in allocating resources to meet those needs. Such decisions are reached through the
political process, and all citizens have the right to a voice in those
decisions. Debate, discussion, pressure
and protest are all part of the process of collective action which determines
which needs should be met and a just distribution of resources. Stewart and Ranson (1988) emphasise that the
public are not merely customers of public sector organisations, but are a part
of the organisation as citizens, and it is to the voice of citizens that
government, through public sector organisations, should respond.
The public service culture was a key feature of the
nationalised industries prior to their privatisation. During World War II Keynes had played an
important role in influencing government policy, emphasising the importance of
fiscal and monetary policy as tools of the government for managing the
economy. Nationalisation was therefore
to some extent a continuance of the idea of economic planning which had been
essential to Britain's war effort, and which had led to the belief that public
allocation of resources was preferable to market allocation. Keynesian economics can thus be seen as a
stock of knowledge drawn upon by the Labour government in the setting up of the
nationalised industries. The public began to expect more of government after
the war, and the belief grew that everyone had the right to basic services,
some of which were considered so essential that they should not be provided on
the basis of profit and individual ability to pay. Principles of universal service at affordable
prices were the basic signification structures underlying the creation of the
nationalised industries. Safety and
security of supply were also very important.
However, there were disadvantages to the public being served by
nationalised industries. As Macintosh
and Scapens (1990) suggest, it is possible for different signification
structures to inform behaviour within an organisation, compared with those
informing its relationships with external parties. In the case of the gas industry, it became
clear from discussions with interviewees that a conflict existed between the
‘public service’ ethos and the ‘public sector’ ethos. While the former can be seen to encapsulate
the positive qualities of nationalised industries as they strive to provide a
just and equitable universal service, the latter encompasses the more negative
aspects, as one senior Finance executive commented:
‘Thinking about what a public service ethos
is, on the positive side is a dedication to customer service, delivery, safety
and security. On the negative side is
‘civil servant’ – jobs for life, don’t need to be responsive to the market,
don’t need to change processes, slow decision-making.’
The key features of the public service culture began to be
challenged when the gas industry was privatised in 1986, as a new commercial
focus was introduced. The commercial
business culture is characterised by new priorities based on providing
consumers with a cost effective and reliable gas supply, with good standards of
service. The organisational mission can
therefore be seen as running a profitable and efficient business. As was pointed out earlier, Stewart and
Ranson's model does not offer any insights regarding this stage of the business
but some cultural structures informing organisational actors behaviour in the
commercial business culture will now be suggested.
The new culture replaces the rights of citizens to have a
voice in the decisions about the allocation of resources, with the right to
participate in the organisation as a shareholder, and earn financial
returns. The concept of the citizen is
replaced by that of the consumer (Harden, 1992), who is owed a cost effective
and efficient service and whose rights are limited to representation in
relation to these aspects of service, rather than the right to be heard in the
decision-making process regarding resource allocation. Cost effectiveness of service provision
replaces the paramount considerations of equity and justice. For management, new signification structures
became important, especially accounting measures of success, such as profit,
shareholder value and rate of return on capital. Performance-related pay provided a
significant impetus to look for more efficient ways of operating. Freedom from restrictions on investment and
borrowing meant that management could look for new ways of expanding the
business, e.g. overseas operations. For
the public, ownership of public services as citizens was replaced by ownership
as shareholders - Thatcher's vision of a shareowning democracy was promoted by
a massive advertising campaign encouraging individuals to buy shares in the
privatised British Gas - 'Tell Sid' posters were on every street corner. Their role as citizens with a right to
receive public services was replaced by a new role as consumers in receipt of a
service provided by a privatised monopoly.
The competition culture is based on the need for survival
in a competitive market, appropriately accompanied by a new focus on provision
of high standards of service to customers, who are no longer captive consumers
but free to exercise choice in the market place. The mission of the organisation becomes one
of running a competitive business successfully.
Drawing again on Stewart and Ranson's(1988) comparison, some of the
relevant signification structures in this culture include economic principles
which emphasise the superiority of free market operations, with demand and
price determining the allocation of resources.
Competition, it is believed, will ensure that customers receive the most
efficient service at least cost, since they can take advantage of free choice
in the market. In terms of the consumer
/ citizen / customer distinction (Harden, 1992), the focus in this culture is
distinctly on the customer. As Miller
and Rose (1990) say:
"No longer is citizenship construed in
terms of solidarity, contentment, welfare and a sense of security established
through the bonds of organisational and social life. Citizenship is to be
active and individualistic rather than passive and dependent. The political subject is henceforth to be an
individual whose citizenship is manifested through the free exercise of
personal choice amongst a variety of options. Programmes of government are to
be evaluated in terms of the extent to which they enhance that choice."
In contrast to the importance of the voice of citizens in
making decisions about service provision in the public sector model, in the
private sector model public views and protests are problems to be overcome, not
voices to be heard. 'Exit' from the
market is the signal to which the private sector responds.
Legitimation structures
Within the public service culture acceptance of the
government's moral obligation to provide basic essential services and the
rights of citizens to receive these services, legitimated the existence of
nationalised monopoly utilities. The culture was a paternalistic one, where the
company took care of its employees, providing a secure job for life with good
pay and benefits. Another significant
aspect was the culture of engineering excellence - top management were engineers,
and safety and security of supply were considered the primary goals. Financial considerations were purely
secondary. According to Birkinshaw,
Harden and Lewis (1990):
"The only statutory guideline provided
to the boards running the industries was the duty to break even, taking one year
with another. It seemed to be assumed
that freed from the capitalist imperative of profit, the industries would
automatically serve public economic objectives, political intervention being
limited to directions given in the broader national interest." (pp165-166)
One reason for the emergence of the commercial business
culture was that the Thatcher government wanted to establish the arm's length
relationship with the utilities which was one of the original objectives of
nationalisation, but which failed to operate successfully (Vickers and Yarrow,
1988, Veljanovski, 1987). The lack of a
profit motive in public utilities, their protection from fear of bankruptcy and
the lack of performance evaluation and incentives for management were all seen
as factors which contributed to the problems of nationalised industries, which
could be successfully addressed by privatisation. Freeing industry from 'the dead hand of the
state' legitimated the changes, according to Graham and Prosser (1991), who
suggest that the Thatcher governments saw the privatisation programme as a
means of encouraging responsibility and independence by enforcing the
self-reliance of commercial life and of the market. The government's own commercial objectives
can be seen in the way in which the industry was privatised without any prior
restructuring, effectively creating a private monopoly. This of course resulted in a very successful
flotation, earning the government £5.6 billion.
For the first few years after privatisation, the business
prospered. The first price cap set by
the regulator for the domestic market was not unduly onerous. Plenty of opportunities existed to cut costs
and improve efficiency, as there had been considerable slack in the
nationalised industry. Early retirement
and natural wastage enabled manpower levels to be reduced painlessly. Service levels improved and prices came down,
so consumers were happy, and in 1993 a survey showed that British Gas was second only to Marks and Spencer for the reputation
of its brand name. The company was also
awarded a Chartermark for high quality of service under the terms of the
Citizen's Charter, an initiative to improve quality of service provision in the
public service introduced by John Major, Conservative Prime Minister at the time. Falling prices and improved standards were
accompanied by rising profits. These
developments, together with a continuing regard for social obligations, i.e.
provision of a safe, secure supply, and regard for the needs of the elderly,
disabled and less well-off, legitimated the continuing monopoly position of
British Gas in the domestic market.
Management started to pay themselves private sector level salaries to
reflect their new status as leaders of one of the UK's top ten companies.
The beginning of the competition culture was heralded by
the arrival of the second Director General of OFGAS, who took over in 1993 and
undoubtedly saw promotion of competition as her primary duty. She legitimated her actions by appeal to the
superiority of market forces in the optimal allocation of resources. She was viewed very much as an economic
regulator who employed a staff of ten economists, whereas the previous
regulator had employed only one. On the basis of making maximum effort to
extend competition she legitimated extending her role to become an 'industry'
regulator rather than a 'British Gas' regulator. This necessitated an expansion of her staff
from thirty to over one hundred.
Paradoxically, it appears that as competition grew so too did
regulation. 'Unbundling ' of
organisational activities, aimed at introducing transparency into the costing
of different elements of service provision so that competition could be
introduced wherever possible, became an important focus of regulatory activity. The combination of the above developments,
accompanied by ever tighter price caps, legitimated a huge redundancy programme
- over 25,000 people, one third of the workforce, were made redundant over a
three year period. Frequent
reorganisations meant employees had to regularly reapply for their own
jobs. Focus on financial issues came to
supersede considerations of engineering excellence.[3]
Domination structures
In terms of domination structures in the public service
culture, the British distrust of both private and state monopolies led to the
concept of state-owned industries subject to government directives on general
policy but self-governing in the day-to-day running of their businesses. Nationalised industries faced external
regulation by central government, by ministerial control. It was intended that the Minister, and
ultimately Parliament, would be able to control the broad strategic
decision-making of the business, leaving management in full control of
operations. However, the Minister's
definition of the public interest tended to resemble the interest of the
political party in power, and political objectives led to frequent interference
in operational decision-making. The
ability of the government to dominate industry management by intervention
through informal means over issues of pricing, employment, investment,
borrowing, industrial relations and pay negotiations meant that in reality
management's power was limited.
As the commercial business culture emerged, during the
first five years of privatisation, the regulator was far from idle, and
management's expectation of 'light - handed' regulation was
disappointed. Management and regulator
engaged in several highly - publicised battles, and the regulator's tenacity
was responsible for some of the improvements in quality of service and
reduction of prices. He turned his
attention early on to attempting to introduce competition to the industrial and
commercial markets, although this had not been part of his initial remit. He initiated an MMC inquiry as early as 1987,
which concluded that British Gas had been practising price discrimination in
the sale of gas to contract customers, which was impeding the development of
competition. The company was required to
cease this practice, to publish information on common carriage terms, and to
contract for no more than 90 percent of any new gas field. In 1991, the OFT reviewed the situation, and
concluded that British Gas had complied with the requirements, but that
competition had not resulted. Thus, in
an illustration of the operation of the ‘dialectic of control’ (Giddens, 1979,
1984), the organisation had been sufficiently powerful to continue to operate
as a private sector monopoly for the first five years of privatisation in the
industrial and commercial market. However, the efforts of the regulator
continued, and as the next section will reveal the emergence of the competition
culture, following another MMC inquiry in 1993, saw real change begin to take
place.
When the Gas Bill to privatise the gas industry was going
through Parliament, there was initially no mention made of any duties of the
regulator in relation to competition.
Only a late amendment at the Committee stage by Michael Portillo
resulted in the gas regulator having a duty to enable competition in the market
above 25,000 therms. The weakness of the
competition requirement at that time is widely regarded as being the price the
government had to pay in order to obtain the co-operation of the Chairman of
British Gas at that time for a speedy privatisation. The determination of the first gas regulator
to take his duties in relation to competition seriously led subsequently to
far-reaching changes in the industry. In
1991, as a result of the findings of the OFT review, and in order to avoid
another MMC inquiry, British Gas agreed to halve its share of the contract
market and to separate its pipeline operation from the rest of the
company. Following that, there was a
steady erosion of the company's market power.
Competitors banded together to form the Shippers' Forum, in order to
collectively represent their interests in negotiations with the regulator, and
were soon providing gas to over 60% of industrial and commercial
customers. Domestic competition trials
were introduced in April 1996, with a view to opening that market to full
competition by 1998. One outcome of the
1993 MMC inquiry was a requirement for British Gas to fully separate its
transportation from its trading arm, with 'Chinese walls' preventing employees
of each division from communicating with each other. The foregoing are indicative of new
domination structures coming to the fore.
The regulator had the power to dominate in decision-making, partly due
to her ability to impose decisions without having to justify them. Under UK law
such decisions are not subject to judicial review unless they are ultra vires.
Should British Gas refuse to abide by such a decision, the regulator would
automatically initiate an MMC inquiry, with the attendant intrusion into the
business and vast expenditure in terms of management time. As Miller and Rose (1990) emphasise, the
governing of economic life continued via a variety of regulatory technologies,
even within the new competitive environment.
The foregoing has clearly demonstrated the value of structuration
theory for an analysis of organisational change. As a sensitising device, it helps to make
sense of the social processes which have shaped regulatory control. By studying the interaction of agency and
structures of signification, legitimation and domination, we can gain valuable
insights into the way in which structures were reproduced and transformed, and
of the mutual dependency of agency and structure in the development of the
regulatory process. In the public
service culture, government ministers, drawing on the signification structures
of public service values including universal service and equity of provision,
legitimated government control of major industries by nationalisation. In the commercial business culture the
pursuit of new values and measures of success, such as profitability and
shareholder value, led to domination by business interests and legitimated the
pursuit of financial success. The
continuing monopoly power of British Gas legitimated the introduction of a new
domination structure in the form of the industry regulator. The interaction of agency and structure is
evident, as is the ‘dialectic of control’, as management battled the regulator
in an effort to retain power over its own operations. Eventually, and after much conflict, the
competition culture emerges, with new values based on a belief in the
superiority of the free market for resource allocation legitimating further
intervention by the regulator into the running of the industry.
The production and reproduction of accounting systems and
systems of accountability, and how they can be understood in terms of
individuals drawing upon and reproducing structures of signification,
legitimation and domination, together with an analysis of events which provided
an impetus for change, forms the subject of the remainder of this paper.
SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCOUNTING
SYSTEMS IN THE THREE
CULTURES
Public service culture
Day and Klein (1987) identify three aspects of
accountability, political, managerial and moral, all of which are relevant for
this study. In terms of the public
service culture, firstly political accountability is that of the Secretary of
State to Parliament; secondly managerial acccountability is that of industry
management to the Secretary of State; thirdly moral accountability is reflected
in the particular signification structures which the accountability processes
reinforce, and their related legitimation and domination structures which
operationalise particular norms and moral values by enforcing rights and
obligations. This reflects the way in
which structures of signification, legitimation and domination are drawn upon
to produce and reproduce systems of accountability. In the public service culture political accountability
is very important, given that the nationalised industry should be seen to be
run in the public interest. Drawing on
signification structures which emphasise citizens' rights to equity and justice
and openness for public debate and action, systems of accountability were set
up with the aim of ensuring that industry management were publicly accountable
via the relevant Secretary of State to Parliament. However, an examination of the domination
structures in existence reveals some of the accountability problems which
existed for nationalised industries, and the extent to which the role of
accountability as a means of coercion can take precedence over its role as a
resource for organisation. In terms of
political accountability, several authors discuss the problems. (Glynn, 1993; Normanton, 1971; Vickers and
Yarrow, 1988). Although Ministers were
answerable to Parliament for actions they took, they were still able to exert
informal pressures on management without accountability. This led to a situation where very few formal
directives were issued but where the threat of their use, together with
ministerial powers for appointment to the Board, enabled politicians to
intervene informally to a significant extent in decision-making. The Minister
legitimated his interference by reference to the public interest, but this
tended to be defined according to the interests of the political party in
power. Despite the issue of several White Papers over a period of twenty five
years, accountability did not develop effectively to ensure the protection of
the public interest, and was thus at odds with the purported signification
structures on which nationalised industries were founded.
Day and Klein (1987) emphasise the centrality of
well-defined objectives to programme and effectiveness aspects of systems of
managerial accountability. Again several
deficiencies are clear with respect to accountability of management to
Minister. The legislation pertaining to
the duties of the nationalised industries tended to be couched in very general
terms. While the White Papers tried to
progressively improve the definition of performance measures their success was
limited, as the industries' management were still plagued by the problems of
inappropriate ministerial intervention, and thus lacked adequate authority and
independence to pursue stated objectives.
It is important to note, however, that these deficiencies did not all
work against the industries' management.
As both Glynn’s, (1993) and Normanton's (1971) discussions reveal, the
lack of accountability protected the industries from too much scrutiny, a
factor which may explain why an unsatisfactory system persisted for so long,
and despite the efforts of several White Papers to improve matters.[4] The power of nationalised industry chairmen
was referred to by several authors and interviewees:
‘The management style was one of benevolent
autocrat. It came from people like Sir
Denis Rooke (former Chairman) who was a bully, basically. Very good for the customers and the industry. ‘I know the answer – get on with it. But I’ll look after you and I’ll look after
the customers and make sure it works.
And I’ll keep those thieving politicians out of the way.’’ (Senior
Personnel executive)
In terms of structuration theory, it may be that agency
interacted with existing structures to reproduce rather than significantly
change them, since there were benefits to both ministers and management in
maintaining the status quo - the dialectic of control between the two parties
was maintained. The 1976 NEDO Report
revealed the extent of problems in running nationalised industries and called
for radical change.
The White Papers issued in 1967, 1976 and 1978 tried to
deal with the problems of accountability and control of the nationalised
industries by focussing mainly on the implementation of stricter financial
controls, including investment criteria, financial targets and controls and
pricing policy, thus emphasising the
importance of accounting information. In analysing developments in the use of
financial information, this study emphasises accounting as a situated political
practice, fulfilling an important role as a technology of social and
organisational control, and having the ability not only to reflect but also to
constitute reality. It is worth
reiterating Miller and Rose's (1990) concept of 'government at a distance',
which refers to the diversity of regulatory mechanisms which link the conduct
of individuals and organisations to political objectives through 'action at a
distance'. They cite the use of
investment appraisal techniques in nationalised industries, as an example of an
'intellectual technology', a mechanism which links calculations at one place
with action at another, facilitating the governing of economic life. In structuration terms, the use of such
techniques, as well as the other financial control mechanisms introduced by the
White Papers, can be seen as part of the emergence of new structures of
signification, emphasising not only the public service duties of the
nationalised industries but also the importance of fiscal prudence. By introducing financial measures similar to
those used in the private sector, efforts were made to restrict the relative
autonomy of the engineers who ran the business, and to limit the pre-eminence
of engineering considerations in decision-making.
Accounting systems can be viewed as interpretive schemes
within the signification structure (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990), enabling
communication between regulator and regulated, and being informed by the shared
rules and concepts of accounting practice.
The introduction of new financial techniques is illustrative of an
attempt to introduce new shared understandings of the purposes of the
organisations. The extent of their
success appears to have been limited, as comments from industry management
suggest that they believed themselves to be sufficiently accountable and
fiscally prudent:
‘BG was a heavy contributor to public
funds.’ (Finance executive, Treasury
dept.)
and
BG saw itself as a good company, a
disciplined cost-conscious company. It
was a good nationalised industry.’
(Senior Finance manager)
These new techniques were intended to enable government to
exert control over industry management from a distance, by holding them
accountable for achieving financial targets. Roberts and Scapens (1985) suggest
that the use of accounting systems to achieve distanced forms of accountability
may be seen as more coercive than their use in face-to-face situations, since
the information is more likely to be interpreted in isolation from the context
on which it is reporting. This is likely
to lead to greater efforts on the part of those who are held accountable to
limit the information released. Industry
Chairmen were certainly concerned to retain as much autonomy as possible, and
accounting matters were an important feature of discussions for the
Nationalised Industries' Chairmen's Group.
Given that the Chairmen were all engineers, one could expect some resistance
to increased financial accountability.
The industries were required to publish accounts in similar
format to those of private sector organisations, possibly another attempt to
signify to management that they should operate as far as possible like a
private sector organisation, but the Minister was entitled to stipulate certain
requirements in relation to form and content, thus retaining some power over published financial
information. The dominance of the Minister is also illustrated by the
requirement that the auditors reported to him, rather than an independent body
(Glynn, 1993). Management did not feel unduly pressured by public reporting
requirements, given the relatively restricted audience interested in the
reports, and the relatively relaxed timetable, as evidenced by comments from
two interviewees:
‘For a nationalised industry, readers of
accounts were primarily
Parliamentarians…Accountants, auditors are
now much more concerned about what they sign off on. Price Waterhouse now have to answer to the
Stock Exchange if accounts are unsatisfactory.
Previously, the accounts were a matter for British Gas,
Price Waterhouse, the Department of Trade
and Industry and the Department of Energy – more incestuous.’ (Treasury
department executive)
and
‘Pre-privatisation, all we had to do was to
produce annual financial accounts and submit them to the Department of
Energy. It was a relaxed timetable, and
there were no Stock Exchange or shareholder pressures.’ (Finance manager)
Puxty (1997) provides an interesting analysis of the use of
current cost accounting (CCA) in the accounts of British Gas, in which he
asserts that the decision to retain current cost reporting for the main
published accounts after it had been made non-mandatory was a legitimation
device used by management to report lower profits, in the face of a public
outcry against high profits, partly resulting from a government directive to
increase prices to bring them more into line with those of electricity.
The foregoing provides further evidence of the lack of
satisfactory accountability mechanisms, and the failure of the White Papers to
effect significant organisational change in terms of new meaning structures,
and related structures of legitimation and domination. The conflicts which existed in the running of
the industries were not adequately addressed by the new calculative
technologies, and as mentioned above, the government eventually decided that
full-scale privatisation was required.
It was also pointed out by several people that engineers
were usually the top people in the organisation, and those with most power:
‘It was a command and control culture,
dominated by engineers. Decision-making
then was pick up the phone, tell somebody down the line to open a valve and let
the gas pass through.’ (Senior Personnel executive)
One effect of this was that most decisions regarding the
direction the company would take were essentially engineering rather than
financial decisions. Being structured as
a nationalised monopoly obviously facilitates such an approach, since
commercial constraints are largely absent.
The accounting function was thus subservient to the engineering one.
It is evident that the systems of accountability in
operation were in conflict with the objectives of the public service culture of
which they were a part. One important
unintended consequence of this was that increased government interference over
the years had led to the public perception that nationalised industries were
run directly by the Government, so that the Government was held responsible for
their failures and problems. Poor
performance and industrial relations problems were seen as failures of the
Government, rather than of the industries' management teams. In May 1985, the Government announced its
intention to privatise the gas industry, which it did under the Gas Act of
1986. The business of the British Gas
Corporation was transferred to British Gas plc.
All the ordinary shares of British Gas were sold in December 1986 at a
market capitalisation of £5602.5 million.
Government thus attempted to exert its power to effect a radical change
in the running of the industry, in order to extricate itself from a situation
where its legitimacy was being called into question. The extent to which radical change occurred
will be discussed in subsequent sections.
Commercial business culture
There are several important changes to accountabilities
which took place as a result of privatisation.
In relation to moral accountability, the Gas Act 1986 instituted a new
social and political process of accountability in the setting up of the new
regulatory body. In doing so it provided
a new structure of meanings, a new language of accountability, in defining the
rights and duties of regulator and regulated, embodied a new moral order in
giving the regulator the right to hold the industry to account and provided the
associated resources of domination. Similarly, a new accountability to
shareholders increased the emphasis on the language of financial
accountability, and legitimated the pursuit of profit and improving shareholder
value.
A new system of political accountability was instituted
with the appointment of a regulator and the setting up of the Office of Gas
Supply (OFGAS) to oversee the privatised gas industry. The first regulator's duties to the public
interest under the original legislation included a primary duty of ensuring
universal service, and secondary duties in relation to consumer protection and
promotion of competition. He also was
required to ensure that BG remained financially solvent. The primary means of regulation is the
setting of a price formula, of the form RPI-X, which limits price increases
that the industry can impose and thus forces it to improve efficiency of
operations. The regulator’s duties
include setting and reviewing the price cap and the industry’s compliance with
it. Although formally accountable to
Parliament, the extent to which the regulator is publicly (politically)
accountable is a matter of considerable controversy. Public accountability is constrained by the
fact that the regulator cannot fully disclose the basis of his decisions due to
commercial confidentiality.[5]
Other changes are in relation to managerial accountability
as the Board, instead of being accountable to the Minister, became accountable
to the industry regulator. Additionally, it was accountable to its new owners,
the shareholders, which introduces a new emphasis on the language of financial
accountability and legitimates the pursuit of profit and enhanced shareholder
value. Conflicts exist in the objectives
of regulators and shareholders, which in turn create conflicts for management
in trying to satisfy the requirements of both.
The environment facing a regulated industry is clearly much more complex
than that facing an ordinary organisation in the private sector (Ogden,
1995). Prior to the advent of
privatisation, the division was between public and private sector
organisations, where management of the former had political accountability and
of the latter shareholder accountability.
An important objective of privatisation was to remove the nationalised
industries from political control, in the belief that control by the market
would ensure greater efficiency.
However, the existence of the regulator complicates matters, as the
regulator defines the economic environment to some extent, by imposing the
price-cap and imposing standards of service which the industry must meet. This reduces management's autonomy in
decision-making, which in turn reduces the extent to which shareholders can
hold management accountable for financial results. Nevertheless, incentives
which attempt to ensure goal congruence of managers with investors, such as
performance-related pay and share options, are based on financial performance
achieved in the face of regulatory changes.
The lack of market pressures facing a privatised monopoly impedes an
assessment of management performance.
Just as financial controls were an important feature of
efforts to achieve accountability and control in nationalised industries, so
they should also be central to regulatory control in privatised industries, and
one would expect accounting information to play a key role in regulatory
decision-making. Accounting systems
increased in importance as interpretive schemes enabling communication based on
new shared understandings of the purpose of the organisation in relation to
external reporting to shareholders.
These understandings were informed by new signification structures such as profitability, shareholder value and
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. More
questionable is the degree of shared understanding between management and the
regulator, as management's pursuit of profit for shareholders is at odds with
the regulator's objectives of lower costs for consumers.
Following on from the earlier discussion of Miller and
Rose's (1990) concept of 'government at a distance', we can see the price
formula as a successor to initiatives such as investment appraisal techniques
in nationalised industries as an 'intellectual technology' linking calculation
at one place with action at another, facilitating the governing of economic
life. Developments in the application of the price formula, from the initial
perception of 'lighthanded regulation' to the increasingly intrusive
information demands and increasing complexity of the formula are illustrative
of Miller's (1992) view of accounting's role in decision-making. He suggests that as the shortcomings of one
calculative technology are revealed, this does not discredit it, but simply
leads to the emergence of new ones, in the conviction that:
'..there exists a calculable answer to the
problems of the enterprise and even of social life.' (p.80)
Accounting systems, as discussed earlier, can be viewed as
interpretive schemes within the signification structure, facilitating
communication between regulator and regulated.
They embody the new language of accountability by requiring the
regulated activities of the gas supply business to be accounted for separately from
the other business activities. The
original regulatory accounting requirements for BG were specified in Condition
2 of its Licence. BG was required to
prepare and have audited separate accounts for the gas supply business,
consisting of a profit and loss account and a statement of assets and
liabilities, excluding taxation and any capital liabilities and interest not
relating solely to the gas supply business.
It was also required to produce an interim profit and loss account. As far as possible, the regulatory accounts
were to be prepared using the same format, principles and policies as the
annual accounts. The accounts had to
show separately cost allocations and apportionments between the gas supply
business and any other business of the company.
Any change in a basis of allocation or apportionment had to be agreed by
the regulator. The regulatory accounts
had to be published, with the exception of information on the bases of allocations
and apportionments. Under Condition 7 of
the Licence the DG OFGAS had the power to request additional information
necessary for him to perform the functions assigned to him under the Gas Act. Carey et al (1994, p.14) identify the
accounting information needs of regulators as including the following:
•provision
of information for regulatory reviews, including setting the price cap and
monitoring investment and return on capital
•enabling
the viability of the regulated business to be assessed separately from the
business of the regulated company as a whole, and the identification of possible cross-subsidies between regulated
and non-regulated activities
It is clear that satisfying the above objectives will
require a great deal more information than will be provided in the basic
regulatory accounts, and that the regulator's powers under Condition 7 could
mean that a regulated industry finds itself facing huge demands for accounting
information, with no onus on the regulator to justify his demands. It was the everincreasing ad hoc requirements for additional
information that BG management found most frustrating and costly, especially
when the purpose of the request was not always apparent:
‘The regulator should not be a sink of
information. What they’ve got is lots of
data, not information. Sometimes they
forget the questions they’ve asked before, and that the answer has been
provided. Sometimes it’s impossible to
answer the question in the form it’s been asked. It’s convincing them that you’re not hiding
anything, that this is the best you’ve got available.’ (Senior Finance
manager)
The fact that when the regulator's decisions were handed
down there was usually no justification provided for their basis did not help
management to understand the use to which information had been put. Given the
importance of accounting information to regulatory decision-making, it is
useful to examine areas where opportunities exist for management and regulator
to manipulate it in order to further their own ends, and to provide legitimacy
for their decisions.
Unlike several privatised industries, BG retained its
nationalised industry practice of reporting financial results on a current cost
basis, ostensibly because it considered current cost accounting (CCA) the most
appropriate for a capital intensive industry with long-lived assets. It is
possible under CCA to adopt either an 'operating capital maintenance' (OCM)
approach or a 'financial capital maintenance' (FCM) approach. The former approach, utilised by BG,
emphasises the need of the company as a producer to preserve operating
capacity. The latter is more useful to
the regulator in assessing the extent to which investors' and customers'
conflicting interests are being satisfied by an adequate, but not excessive,
level of profit. In a capital intensive
industry such as BG, the CCA depreciation adjustment is very large and the
ability to manipulate this figure, based as it is on subjective asset
revaluations, could be useful to management in trying to legitimise arguments
for a less onerous price-cap by portraying low CCA profits. On the other hand, historic cost accounting
(HCA) profits, the main interest of the financial markets, remain unaffected.
In identifying an appropriate rate of return for the
network, the regulator has to attempt to identify the cost of capital of that
aspect of the business. The value
attached to fixed assets, a major element of capital employed, will obviously
have a strong impact on rate of return calculations. Although regulation of the RPI-X form was
meant to avoid the problems of rate of return regulation, it is clear that
regulators have subsequently recognised the importance of this measure, and
indeed the 1993 MMC Report recommended rates of return of between 4 and 4.5% on
existing assets, and between 6.5 and 7.5% on new assets. Opportunities are afforded by CCA for
revaluation of fixed assets, using appropriate indices, once again possibly
providing scope for influencing regulatory decision-making. Upward revaluations of fixed assets would
also increase current cost depreciation in future years, thereby reducing the
numerator in the rate of return calculation as well as increasing the
denominator.
In their investigation, Carey et al (1994) discovered that
in 1985, shortly before flotation, BG increased the lives of many assets. Depreciation was written back so that assets
were held at the value they would have had if the revised lives had always been
in force. They calculate that this added
over £3 billion (30%) to the CCA net value of assets and £150 million to the
annual depreciation charge. The
suspicion with which BG's adherence to CCA was viewed is well-illustrated by an
editorial from the Daily Telegraph (10 June 1986), discussing the fact that
BG's accounts, subsequent to privatisation, would provide supplementary HCA
information in addition to the main published CCA accounts:
'Next
month the 1985-6 results will reveal, for the first time, just how profitable
British Gas really is. The figures will
be calculated on the basis of accounting used by everyone else, not the funny
money Sir Denis has favoured in the past.'
Puxty (1997) suggests that one reason for this new policy
was that as a prelude to privatisation it was necessary to publish the annual
accounts on the same basis as those of private sector organisations. It is interesting to reflect here on how CCA
accounting as an interpretive scheme was used by BG to constitute a particular
reality, which was at odds with the financial reality of almost every other
organisation in the U.K. It can be
argued that financial information is used to legitimate regulatory
decision-making, and the reporting of lower levels of profit could provide
legitimacy for BG in the eyes of the public - it may be that after public
outcries against large profits in nationalised industry days, management was
anxious to avoid similar criticism given that it had retained monopoly status
in the private sector, and that there could be complaints about excessive
returns to shareholders. The tightening
of the price formula, together with increased
regulation aimed at fostering competition, led to the start of what was
subsequently to become a huge redundancy programme, again legitimated by appeal
to new signification structures, and the further erosion of the public service
culture and its replacement by the commercial business culture. Accounting's
role as a technology of social and organisational control, able not only to
reflect but also to constitute reality has been demonstrated in this section,
as we have seen new accountings emerge to shape and reflect new organisational
realities.
Competition culture
As was discussed in the previous section, the Gas Act of
1986 instituted a new social and political process of accountability in the
setting up of OFGAS, by providing a new structure of meanings for interaction,
legitimating the regulator's right to hold industry management to account and
providing the associated resources of domination. The Gas Act of 1995 added a
new element to the language of accountability when it provided the regulator
with additional powers, particularly in relation to the introduction of
domestic competition. New signification
structures emphasising market forces and freedom of choice in the market were
emergent. The previous section also
questioned the extent to which the regulator has adequate political
accountability, and this section provides additional reasons for criticism of
this aspect of the regulatory regime, in relation to both political
responsiveness and stewardship. Systems of accountability have been recognised
as having the capacity to provide a resource for organisation, as well as a
resource for coercion, and given the considerable authority which the regulator
has, it is important to consider the accountability process whereby she is held
answerable for the consequences of the far-reaching decisions she is empowered
to make.
A notable development in the area of accountability was a
commitment on the part of the second BG
regulator, Clare Spottiswoode, to more consultation and transparency in the
regulatory process. Consultation
documents were produced on all major issues, and views sought from a wide
variety of contributors, as evidenced in a statement in a document published in
June 1995, entitled 'Price Control Review British Gas' Transportation and
Storage' :
"OFGAS wishes to conduct this review in
as open a way as possible and to take into account the views of all interested
parties. This document therefore sets
out the background and invites views on the principles and processes to be
applied in the review including the form of the new control. Views are sought from all interested parties
including customers, customer groups, shippers and suppliers." (p.4)
One interviewee, of BG Regulatory Affairs, pointed out that
being unaccountable has disadvantages as well as advantages:
"Accountability has two sides to it. The noise made by regulated companies and
politicians is regulators have undue discretion but don't have to explain
themselves to anyone, so we don't know why they take decisions. We had a situation where a change of
regulator caused some changes in policy.
It was a different personality taking a different interpretation of the
same situation, so it was a bit unstable.
The other side of accountability has begun to worry the regulators -
what are they actually accountable for?
If you have a wide remit, that's fine and you have these powers and can
take decisions and no-one can challenge you.
But then you realise that if things don't go quite as well as everyone
thinks they should, then you get the blame for everything. Why should you, because it's not clear what
you're actually accountable for? Some of
the regulators are now saying we need to have more precise terms there needs to
be more accountability. I think
regulators are now finding it's fine to take wide powers against an incumbent
monopolist, but once you start regulating competition in that industry it's a
much more complex thing because you have many more players and the question of
equity between different players comes into effect."
The regulator was clearly concerned that inadequate accountability
threatened her legitimacy. Although the DG attempted to improve consultation
procedures, there were still many critics who complained that consultation does
not itself improve accountability for decision-making, in that decisions could
still be imposed without adequate reasons being given. Decisions on major issues which have been the
subject of consultation are published in a document entitled 'The Director
General's Decision', which includes a summary of responses received by OFGAS on
an issue, followed by a summary of the DG's position on the issue and finally
implications/amendments to BG's Authorisation required to implement the
decision. The summaries tend to be
brief, although OFGAS does try to place as many responses as possible in the library,
where they are available for consultation by the public, subject to requests
for confidentiality from respondents.
Another area of concern is the extent to which the
regulator can choose to prioritise the duties imposed upon her in the Gas
Act. According to a regulatory
consultant:
"If you read the Acts the number of
primary and secondary duties appear very comprehensive. If you look at the documents coming out of
OFGAS now, you will see that they centre on one duty only, and that is the promotion
of competition. There may be what looks
like a fairly broadly-defined set of duties but in practice regulators,
certainly in the gas industry, are free to concentrate on what they
choose."
Certainly in the June 1995 OFGAS price
control review document for Transco, it is stated:
"Given the duties placed on the DGGS by
the existing and anticipated new legislation, the principle that will drive the
setting of the Transco price control is that the regulator needs to seek to
promote competition where feasible and regulate as a surrogate for competition
where it is not."(p.18)
The foregoing has identified a number of problems in
relation to the public accountability of the regulator. In terms of political responsiveness there
are shortcomings in the reporting requirements of the regulator which mean
that, although her duties are broadly defined and appear quite comprehensive,
there is in fact considerable scope to choose which duties to prioritise. In the view of some respondents in this
study, this allowed the gas regulator to concentrate her efforts on
competition, to the exclusion of other concerns. This is reflected in the quotation in the
previous paragraph, as well as in the need felt by the Gas Consumers Council (GCC)
to retain its independence from OFGAS to better represent and protect the
interests of customers. These views
question the new moral order, highlighting the potential conflict between
competition and customer rights, and questioning the validity of the
regulator's focus on the introduction of competition wherever possible. These
problems provide the opportunity for systems of accountability to better serve
coercion rather than operating as a resource for better organisation and
improvement of operations. That the
criticisms were justified is confirmed by the fact that the regulator herself
publicly called for more accountability to be required of her office.
In relation to managerial accountability numerous problems
were also identified. As the regulator
began to encroach further and further into the running of the business, it
became very difficult for management to know what they would be held to account
for next, and when their own authority to run the business would be further
undermined. Many of the problems of
accountability identified in relation to inappropriate informal intervention by
Ministers in nationalised industry operations are echoed here and it can be
argued that the ensuing conflicts in both cases eventually resulted in a crisis
situation leading to a decision to effect radical change in the structure of
the industry, as management eventually decided to demerge the
organisation. Another problem for
management is in relation to conflicting accountabilities to regulator and
shareholders. The increasing power of
the regulator effectively eroded the power of shareholders, as stronger
regulation and the uncertainty engendered by so much change eroded the value of
investments. Evidence also exists of the
disadvantages to customers in terms of much poorer service standards, resulting
in a greatly increased level of complaints and loss in 1995 of BG's
Chartermark, awarded in 1993 for ‘excellence in public service’. Thus we see the signification structures of
the commercial business culture, of shareholder value and profitability,
superseded by new structures based on a belief in competition and customer
choice in free markets, informing and changing accountability relationships,
and we see that the change is not unproblematic.
The consultation process developed by OFGAS required a
great deal of information from BG, and led to a need for extensive use of
consultants to analyse the information provided, given that much of the
information was financial in nature and OFGAS employed only two accountants on
its staff. Consultants were also used by
interested parties to prepare their submissions to OFGAS on key issues. Several large shippers banded together to
form the Shippers' Forum to enable them to jointly represent their interests to
OFGAS. The extension of regulation which
has taken place over the last few years, as documented above, led to greatly
increased demand by OFGAS for financial information from BG, and also to much
more in-depth examination of the financial aspects of the business. This section will examine the way in which
accounting systems, as interpretive schemes within the signification structure,
give visibility to new aspects of organisational activities, and enable new
associated legitimation and domination structures to emerge.
Two price formula reviews were carried out in 1997, one for
Transco and one for the rest of the plc.
Emphasis on unbundling of activities to ensure competition wherever
possible, meant that the costs of operating the different parts of the business
had to be identified. The need to 'understand
our costs' was referred to by many interviewees, who all emphasised that this
had not been a priority when they were running an integrated business. One outcome of regulatory information
requirements was the adoption of activity based costing (ABC) to enable
provision of information about different parts of the business:
‘A
major benefit will be getting a better understanding of our business. One of the things we’ve got to understand for
competition is: ‘What does it cost us to supply different sorts of customers?’ we can’t deal with our 18 million customers
as a homogeneous mass anymore…We’re trying to segment our market to get proper
cost reflectivity in each market, and know how much we can put in to fighting
to keep these customers, and charge cost reflective tariffs. ABC is going to be a key weapon in doing
that.’ (Finance manager)
The recognition of the value of ABC for running the
business led to the subsequent decision to implement it throughout BG.
The consultation document issued by OFGAS in June 1995,
'Price Control Review British Gas Transportation and Storage', indicated the
regulator's intention to focus on, among other things, a detailed examination
of Transco's operating costs, cost of capital and asset valuation. She stated
that she would require forecast information on Transco's expected capital and
operating expenditure for the next 25 years, based on a range of
scenarios. The information would be
subject to efficiency studies, including consideration of whether anticipated
technological developments would extend the life of assets and reduce their
replacement cost in the future, as well as consideration of how actual expenditure
since 1992 compared with that claimed as necessary by BG at the time. In considering the cost of capital she
pointed out the importance of identifying the appropriate regulatory value of
assets for BG plc and also the proportion of these attributable to
Transco. Consideration was also given to
whether a cash basis of regulation would be more appropriate than the existing
method whereby depreciation was included in the cost base when setting the
price formula. The reason for this was
that Transco's capital expenditure profile is not smooth. A report issued by BZW on 26
September 1995, entitled 'OFGAS piles on the agony' pointed out that at that
time
Transco's expenditure on replacing
the pipeline network was running at less than a quarter of current cost
depreciation, meaning that under the existing price control the business was hugely
cash positive. In theory Transco should
have been building up cash reserves for use when the bulk of the pipeline
network became due for replacement around the year 2010.
OFGAS identified its concerns as follows:
"The
regulated company may receive at least three types of benefit from depreciation
being included in its cost base when depreciation is in excess of capital
expenditure. First, depreciation itself makes no allowance for the interest
benefit from receiving income in advance of expenditure. Second, technical progress will probably have
ensured that, when eventually replaced, the asset will cost less than implied
by current cost depreciation which has been computed on an indexed or modern
equivalent asset basis. Third,
accounting lives of assets will be 'prudent' and there is a high probability
that the assets will, in fact, last longer, thus magnifying the first two
effects....It is possible that customers will pay now to build up reserves
which are not subsequently required on the same scale or timescale. The point has also been made that if the company
was allowed to raise cash in excess of expenditure requirements in the present
period, the cash when required at some point in the future might not be
available. "(p.26)
BZW identified the likely financial impact on Transco of
such a change as reducing the level of revenue BG was permitted to earn by
£1,000 million during the period 1993/4 to 1996/7, a reduction of almost 10
percent.
The foregoing provides clear evidence of extremely detailed
involvement of the regulator in the financial affairs of the business. Detailed consideration of financial issues
such as bases of asset valuation, operating costs, cost of capital and
depreciation policy certainly provided new visibility to many aspects of
organisational activity. The regulator
used accounting as an interpretive scheme to help initiate a new shared
understanding of organisational purpose, based on signification structures of
competition and free market principles, legitimated by an appeal to the
superiority of market forces in providing the best deal for the customer, and
drawing on domination structures provided to her in the Gas Acts, which meant
that she has a great deal of power to demand information on all aspects of the
business. The contrast between the
content of the regulatory accounts, prescribed by statute, and the information
demanded by the regulator on an adhoc basis is enormous. In addition, she did not restrict herself to
basing decisions on historic information, but predicted the likely impact of
future technological developments on the costs of running the business in years
to come, and adjusted Transco's allowable costs accordingly. The developments described here provide real
evidence of the potential of accounting for effecting organisational change. A senior Finance manager also commented on
the drain on resources which regulatory information requests involved:
“It's become clear in the tariff formula
negotiations that they're expecting too much. You've got to bear in mind that
we're still one company. Their
requirements for information are substantial, and are diverting key
resources. We're changing the
business. The last thing we need is to
have to spend a lot of time satisfying information requests for the regulator. They lack commercial experience. Theoretical economists - they say, use
marginal costing. What is the marginal
cost of an extra 100,000 customers?
Absolutely irrelevant to BG now - we're about to lose hundreds of
thousands of customers.”
The foregoing illustrates the huge burden of providing
regulatory information, and that the power of the regulator in demanding such
information appears to be limitless. As
a technology of social and organisational control, accounting has been employed
as a powerful weapon. The information
demands and interviewee comments discussed above relate to a time period prior
to BG's decision to demerge the business, which was announced in early February
1996. A driving factor in this decision
was the effect of take-or-pay liabilities on BG’s profitability. These liabilities arose as a result of the
development of the ‘gas bubble’, a term given to the over-supply of gas in the
market, which in turn led to the creation of a spot market for gas, where
previously there had been only a contract market. BG found itself in 1995 facing an over-supply
position of almost 25% of its gas demand.
There were several reasons for this, all deriving from the fact that BG
no longer managed the market for supply and demand. It had lost market share in the industrial
and commercial sectors much more quickly than anticipated when many of its
long-term purchase contracts, partly as a result of regulatory changes. Most BG purchase contracts were for 20-25
years, so clearly many were signed when market conditions facing the company
were very different. These contracts
involved BG in take-or-pay commitments, i.e. they had to pay for gas regardless
of whether they could use it. One
serious unintended consequence of the introduction of competition was a
financial crisis which stemmed from this development and which contributed to
the creation by British Gas of two separate companies, one containing the
trading activities and onerous gas contract liabilities, and the other
containing the transportation and exploration activities. The demerger, the
largest corporate restructuring ever undertaken in the UK, resulted in the
formation of two new companies, British Gas and Centrica, in 1997. This went much further than the requirements
of the 1995 Gas Act, which required only the creation of a new trading
subsidiary. This situation provides one
instance of the operation of the dialectic of control, as BG used the resources
available to it to influence events. It
seems highly likely that recognition of the power of accounting to provide
transparency of operations also contributed to the decision to undertake such a
radical restructuring, since there was little advantage to be gained by
remaining integrated, and indeed the cost in time and money of having to
provide so much information was detracting from management's ability to run the
business. In terms of the dialectic of
control, it appears that the only avenue left for management to exert its
authority was to take the course of breaking up the business, in order to
prepare most effectively for the new competition culture which was now inevitable.
This section has demonstrated how structuration theory can
provide insights into the operation of accounting systems and systems of
accountability in organisations, by enabling an analysis of these systems to be
carried out in terms of individuals drawing upon and reproducing structures of
signification, legitimation and domination.
In the public service culture the language of accountability was based
on a belief in the rights of citizens to universal service, and legitimated the
right of government to dominate industry management by holding them accountable
for provision of such a service.
However, systems of accountability were sometimes used as a means of
coercion against management by ministers pursuing political ends, which in turn
led the public to hold government accountable for unsatisfactory performance in
nationalised industries. Thus problems
with systems of accountability contributed to the government’s decision to
undertake radical organisational change by privatising the gas industry. A new social and political process of
accountability was introduced with privatisation, but conflicts were not
eliminated. Industry management became
accountable to their new owners, the shareholders, legitimating their pursuit
of profitability and enhanced shareholder value. This was tempered, however, by a new
domination structure in the form of the industry regulator, who had the power
to limit the prices charged and profits earned by a privatised monopoly. Ongoing accountability problems included the
lack of public accountability of the powerful industry regulator. In the competition culture, a new element was
added to the language of accountability when the regulator’s powers were
widened by the Gas Act of 1995 to pursue the introduction of competition in the
domestic market for gas. Evidence was
provided of further conflict, as the regulator increasingly used her powers to
dominate industry management, until finally further radical change took place
when management made the decision to demerge the organisation by the creation
of two new companies.
The central importance of accounting information to systems
of accountability and organisational change was demonstrated in the
consideration of developments as accounting came to embody a new language of
accountability in each of the three cultures.
Ogden (1995) discusses the shift in the water industry from a
‘vocabulary of costs’ in the nationalised industry to a ‘vocabulary of profits’
after privatisation. Similar
developments have been demonstrated here in relation to the gas industry,
and extended to encompass the
‘vocabulary of competition’ which was the next step for BG. Accounting’s role in relation to structures
of domination and legitimation has also been highlighted in the discussion of
its increasing importance to the regulator as she endeavoured to extend
competition in the industry. Further
evidence of Power and Laughlin’s (1992) assertion of ‘accountingisation’, as
the extension of accounting’s importance in the public sector, is provided in this
analysis of the extension of the power of accounting in a privatised industry.
CONCLUSION
This paper has provided a structuration analysis of
organisational change and management control in the privatised gas
industry. It has demonstrated the value
of structuration theory as a research methodology, given its emphasis on the
interaction of agency and structure in the production and reproduction of
social systems. Additionally, it has
been shown that by acknowledging the possibility of conflict and contradiction,
the theory also provides for the critique and analysis of change. A case study research method was used for its
potential to develop ‘…a rich theoretical framework which is capable of
explaining the holistic quality of observed social systems and the practices of
human actors’ (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1993, p.118). The paper demonstrated how concepts of
culture can be understood in terms of structures of signification, legitimation
and domination and used as a framework for a study of management control and
organisational change. Three distinct
cultures were identified as pertaining to the gas industry over the ten year
period since privatisation: cultures of public service, commercial business and
competition. The case study provided empirical
evidence of the existence of the three cultures, as well as providing insights
into the processes of change which led to the emergence of each new culture.
Key findings included identification of the many control
problems in the nationalised gas industry which provided the impetus for
radical organisational change in the form of privatisation of the industry by
government. Among these were serious
accountability problems which often resulted in nationalised industries being
used by successive governments to further their own political objectives. This interference led to government's
legitimacy being questioned by a public who held them responsible for poor
industry performance. Also in terms of
domination structures, industry management were found to wield significant
power in defining the industry's objectives and how it would operate. This led to the existence of a strong
engineering culture, with priority given to engineering excellence. Accounting systems were shown to be
relatively ineffective in enabling adequate accountability in terms of
stewardship to be enforced. From a
control perspective, the accounting function was subservient to the engineering
function, reflecting the fact that decision-making in the organisation revolved
around engineering rather than financial considerations. The monopoly position of the organisation,
together with the existence of cross-subsidies of services, meant that a
detailed understanding of
cost behaviour was not considered necessary. Conflict between industry management and
government and public criticism of poor performance in terms of high prices and
low standards of service were perhaps the result of a conflict between a public
service and a public sector ethos, where the former conveys a commitment to
running the industry in the public interest and the latter to running the
industry in the interest of organisational members. The resulting loss of legitimacy led to the
privatisation of the industry in 1986.
The emergence of the commercial business culture was
examined, key features of which were new signification structures of
profitability and shareholder value. New
domination structures included the appointment of the regulator and ownership
by shareholders. Its organisational
structure as a privatised monopoly enabled British to meet shareholder and City
expectations without significant organisational change in the first few years
after privatisation. However, a
determined regulator persisted in challenging BG management with the aim of
introducing competition into the industrial and commercial markets and
improving service standards in the domestic market. The constitutive role of accounting in
creating organisational reality was demonstrated in relation to BG's practice
pre-privatisation of producing published accounts prepared on the basis of
current cost accounting principles (CCA), in contrast to most of the rest of
U.K. industry, whose accounts were prepared under historic cost accounting
principles (HCA). It was widely believed
that the practice of CCA reporting by BG was used to legitimate higher prices
by reporting lower profits. Although BG
was required to produce HCA accounts when it was privatised, it continued to
produce CCA accounts as the main accounts, and put HCA information in the less visible
Notes to the accounts. Another important
finding was that accountability problems were not solved by privatisation - the
lack of well-defined mechanisms to ensure public accountability of regulators
was discussed.
Developments in the competition culture documented the
undoubted capacity of conflict and crisis to effect radical change, as was
demonstrated in the eventual demerger of British Gas into two separate
organisations. The increasing power of
the regulator following the findings of the 1993 MMC inquiry and the passing of
the Gas Act 1995 as enabling legislation for the introduction of domestic
competition left management in no doubt that regulation was becoming much more
intrusive and would require significant organisational change. Prior to the demerger this was evidenced in
the 1993 announcement of a major restructuring which included the loss of
25,000 jobs, in preparation for the more competitive environment of the
future. Continuing conflict between
regulator and management and the 'gas bubble' crisis of 1995 saw management
finally reach the decision to demerge, after fighting for ten years to retain
an integrated organisational structure.
Accounting information was shown to have taken on a crucial role in
relation to organisational change, enabling a new language of accountability by
giving new visibility to organisational activities, and informing and
legitimating the adoption of new values within the organisation. Public accountability of the regulator was
shown to continue to be problematic, as criticism was voiced of her freedom to
prioritise regulatory duties according to her own preferences. This was seen by some to have resulted in
undue concentration on competition issues, to the exclusion of protection of
the public interest, since there is no universal agreement that competition
best serves the public interest in all circumstances. It would appear that, ten years after
privatisation and as the result of much conflict and a number of crises,
radical change had indeed taken place in the gas industry and the move to a
competition culture was virtually complete.
This paper contributes to the
literature on management control and organisational change, with particular
emphasis on the role of accounting systems and systems of accountability in
processes of change, by providing a contextual analysis of developments in the
gas industry during a period of turbulent change. In terms of methodology it demonstrates the
suitability of Giddens’ (1979, 1984) structuration theory as a basis for a
contextual study of management control and organisational change. The paper also has implications for future
policy making in relation to appropriate regulatory structures for privatised
industries, given that it highlights the far-reaching consequences for the gas
industry of some of the limitations of the existing system of regulation. In particular many of the findings regarding
ongoing accountability problems have subsequently been substantiated in the
consideration in the 1998 Green Paper, ‘A Fair Deal for Consumers’ of these
very issues. In particular it discusses
the need to strengthen the existing regulatory framework in order to adequately
define the roles of regulator and government, to avoid the danger of an
unconstrained and unaccountable regulator.
It also asserts that there is a need for more openness and
accountability in regulation to ensure that it is transparent, predictable and
consistent. It suggests that this could
be achieved by placing a statutory duty on regulators to consult on and publish
and follow a code of practice on consultation and decision making processes,
publish reasons for key decisions and provide in Annual Reports comprehensive
coverage of their activities, processes and decisions, in a format useful for
Parliament, consumers and other interests. Recognition of the possible dangers
of unconstrained competition in provision of essential services is provided in
the recommendation that there should be introduced a new primary statutory duty
for regulators – to protect consumers – where
possible by the promotion of competition.
It also suggests that consumer representation should be set on an
independent statutory basis, and that regulators should be required to consult
consumer bodies in reaching key decisions.
These last two recommendations both recognise that competition will not
necessarily best serve the interests of customers. It may yet transpire that the changes
undergone in the gas industry were to the detriment of organisational
effectiveness and consequently also to the detriment of customers, and this
paper has demonstrated that many of these changes came about as a result of the limitations of the existing
regulatory structures.
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[1] While it might be
suggested that restricting the focus of interviews to management at such a
senior level could lead to a biased point of view being provided, it was
considered important for this study to target those people who were directly
involved in, and responsible for dealing with regulatory issues.
[2] The author was previously
employed by British Gas as an accountant , and former colleagues were contacted
for help in gaining access to relevant personnel.
[3] Cedric Brown, the former
Chief Executive and the last engineer on the Board, retired (unwillingly) in
May 1996.
[4] Glynn’s (1993) comments
that directives to enhance accountability of industry management would have led
to the release of commercially sensitive information seems to be a poor excuse
in view of BGC’s massive monopoly power, but is echoed later in management’s
battles with the regulator post-privatisation, albeit with less success.
[5] In addition, the English
legal system is not conducive to full disclosure, since when a regulator does
not provide reasons for his decisions, the law will not seek to challenge these
decisions provided they are not ‘ultra vires’, i.e. beyond the regulator’s
powers.
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